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Abstract
Risk management and risk communication affect everybody’s daily life. Local authorities have the duty 
to manage public structures, to inform civilians of the risks coming from these structures, to implement 
prophylaxis procedures. Military storage sites are fully included in this category. This article presents – 
through a qualitative methodology based on risk analysis – how risk management and communication 
in weapons and ammunition warehouses is managed in a “partially free” country, using as a case-study, 
the Malhazine depot in Mozambique, which resulted in more than 100 deaths. In 2007, an extraordinary 
accident related to the management of obsolete conventional weapons occurred at the Malazhine 
warehouse.  In this circumstance, the Mozambican Government adopted a policy of classifying the 
information “highly confidential”. This policy aimed at obscuring facts and responsibilities by hiding 
the causes of such a huge tragedy. This article concludes with the consideration that a high level of 
confidentiality in treating issues of public interest, such as the one kept in regard to Malhazine, does 
not help public authorities to effectively manage and prevent similar risks from occurring again, with 
resulting negative impacts on local populations.
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Introduction
Among the man-made risks, the risk originating by explosions of a weapon or ammunition 
at their storage sites is one of the less understood and, therefore, one of the most dangerous.
The frequency of these accidents, in particular after the 1990s, has increased. Their 
impact was terrifying due to high demographic density near many of these sites. In fact, from 
1995 to 2010 218 accidents of this kind were registered, which caused 4.700 fatalities and about 
5.700 people suffering injuries (U.S. Department of State, 2010).
The areas in which such events were more frequent are Eastern Europe and Africa and, 
secondly, Latin America. In Eastern Europe, the most devastating incidents were the ones 
occurring in Serbia (and Afghanistan) in 2006, Gërdec (Albania), Bulgaria and Uzbekistan in 
2008, Ulyanovsk (Russia) and in Kazakhstan in 2009. In Africa, tremendous accidents occurred 
in Nigeria in 2002, resulting in more than 1000 deaths, in the Congo Democratic Republic (300 
deaths) in 2009, Sudan in 2007, Mozambique in Beira in 2003 and in Maputo (Malhazine) in 
2005 and 2007, Tanzania in 2011 (26 deaths). Finally, the most serious accident of this kind 
in Latin America occurred in 1995 in Brazil, where an explosion at an ammunition warehouse 
took more than 100 lives (U.S. Department of State, 2010).
In order to decrease this risk, in 1993, the U.S. Department of State, funded a campaign 
of about 2 billion dollars in nearly 50 countries. A great part of the money was used to discard 
obsolete weapons. Nevertheless, these measures proved to be insufficient to eliminate explosions 
and the consequent damages without accountability measures, which “will continue to become 
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more important” than the intervention of international community (Rutherford & Williams, 
2015: 56).
The risk represented by such a great concentration of weapons and ammunition in 
military storage units faces an evident contradiction between the management of these depots 
and the principles of risk communication. This research aims at analysing how arms depots are 
managed in one of these countries characterized by a limited level of democracy, Mozambique. 
The main hypothesis is that specific reasons – namely the continuous political-military tension 
- have induced the local government to adopt a “silence strategy” regarding the management of 
the risk herein considered; and that this option has resulted in fatalities and in the impossibility 
to improve the security of ammunition storages all over the country, as clearly demonstrated 
by the fact that, after Malhazine’s explosion, other similar incidents occurred in Mozambique.
This research is embedded into the theory of risk management and risk communication, 
using as its main framework political risk analysis (Bussotti, 2014; Bussotti, 2015). This 
approach employs a qualitative methodology, based Mozambique as case study. In addition to 
international documents, a limited number of local documents and comments in newspapers or 
in blogs available are analysed as well. An attempt to incorporate some oral sources was been 
carried out, but their level of confidentiality was so high that this material could not be used for 
a scientific article. 
Theoretical Framework: Risk Management and Risk Communication
“Risk” has assumed a pivotal importance in current social sciences, taking on with time 
various formulations and interpretations. If its origins, in modern age, can be found in the 
financial calculation of risk by Italian merchants starting from the 15th century, this process 
brought, in the age of capitalism, to more and more sophisticated risk calculation (Purcell, 2016). 
Following a Weberian tradition, many authors stated that a “rational state,” with professional 
bureaucracy, where there is certainty of administrative procedures, and without corruption (e.g. 
nepotism and conflict of interests by public servants), is necessary to allow the entrepreneur 
to focus his/her attention on assessing the risk stemming from economic factors (Dahl, 1957; 
Kalberg, 1980).  
In these first conceptualizations of risk the economic and financial perspectives prevailed. 
It was only in the United States, with the “Chicago School”, that other forms of risk, namely 
linked to environmental issues, began to be included in sociological studies, pointing out the 
necessity to join urban planning with social interventions.
Nevertheless, specific events after the end of the Second World War served to catalyse 
the attention of public opinion regarding environmental and man-made risks. Very serious 
accidents of great industrial plants all over the world helped to develop a different concept of 
risk and risk communication: only to remember some of them, it is worth here mentioning the 
Little Rock AFB (Arkansas) accident in 1965, which killed 65 workers, the Seveso disaster 
in Italy in 1976, in which a very dangerous toxic cloud of dioxin released from the plant of 
ICMESA of Meda, the Three Miles Island nuclear explosion in 1979, the Chernobyl disaster in 
1986 caused by a problem at the nuclear power plant in Prypiat (Ukraine), the Bhopal disaster 
in India in 1984, in which the Union Carbide Pesticide Plant began to leak toxic gases into the 
atmosphere, with about 15.000 deaths, the collision of the Exxon Valdez with the Bligh Reef 
in 1989, which created an oil spill which killed about a quarter million birds, the Fukuyama 
nuclear disaster in 2011, only to name a few. 
It was during the sixties that a new approach towards man-made risks was formulated, 
starting from the analysis of nuclear and technological risks (Sowby, 1965; Starr, 1969). Such 
concepts were understood outside the academic circles thanks to the formulations of sociologists 
such as Luhmann, Beck, Giddens and Douglas (Luhmann, 1979; Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1990; 
Douglas, 1992). These authors consider risk as the main component of a “second modernity” or 
“reflexive modernity” (Beck, Giddens & Lash, 1994), whose main feature is the unpredictability 
of this kind of risks (Lupton, 1999; Sousa Santos, 2004).
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Building on the analyses of the authors above mentioned and from studies on risk perception 
(Slovic, 1993; Sjöberg, Moen & Rundmo, 2004), a consistent group of scholars developed the 
idea that risk can be better managed through planned strategies of risk communication. In short, 
risk communication is the comprehension of both scientific and technological risks within a 
certain structure, which cannot neglect to transmit to the public this knowledge in a very simple 
way. It also, includes, a political strategy to openly communicate the possible consequences of 
this risk (Sinisi, 2004; Covello, 1983; Slovic, 1987), developing best practices to prevent, face 
and manage risk. 
In the nineties specific strategies of communication were conceived in order to face 
situations of “crisis” (Fiorino, 1990; Covello, Sandman & Slovic, 1998; Sandman, 2001). 
Awareness regarding these issues has been growing quickly in the last thirty years in 
Western countries, also thanks to the role of mass-media which, in many cases, have adopted, 
as their editorial lines, the social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al., 1988). 
The scenario in countries with limited levels of democracy – as the great part of the 
countries involved in explosions of weapons warehouses – and even more in a military context 
is completely different: institutional accountability is modest if not null. Thus, the management 
of these structures is left to be handled by economic, politic and military elites who often have 
personal interests in hiding the nature of their activities. Therefore, risk communication rarely 
is applied, maintaining a high level of discretion. 
Risk Management and Risk Communication in Ammunition Depots
The risk deriving from ammunition depots and especially the explosions of arms within 
them can be included in the vast category of the man-made risks. Its management has to respect 
some basic principles which constitute a guarantee to reduce the risk of tragic events. Military 
bodies should share with public opinion, especially local authorities and people living nearby 
the arms depot, the essential information regarding the management of these warehouses and 
the measures to reduce risks. Such approach has been defined as “stockpile management”: it 
designates “a wide-ranging term that covers specific technical areas related to the safety and 
security of ammunition and explosives in accounting, storage, transportation and handling” 
(SAFERWORLD, 2012: 3). Today, of the about 200 million military firearms, 76 million are 
surplus. As pointed out by the Safeworld report, “lax security makes theft easy”, with the 
decisive help of corrupted officials, increasing considerably the risk of disasters, first of all 
explosions (IDEM: 3). 
As in the case of great plants, the concept of risk management in stockpiles includes the 
principles of good practices, accountability and information to local communities. 
At least four main international documents regulate the way in which conventional 
ammunition should be registered and stored:  1) U. N. Resolution  60/74  2)  U.N. Programme 
of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All Its Aspects (approved in 2001), according to which each State should implement a legal 
system to establish adequate and detailed procedures to manage stockpiles; 3) the Document 
produced by OSCE on the conventional ammunition stock, FSC.DOC, November, the 19th 2013, 
and 3)  the Document STANAG 2953 regarding the identification of ammunition (AOP-3(B). 
Three basic practices are recommended: ammunition markings, registration and 
register keeping (OSCE, 2008). Each practice aims at limiting a specific risk; the “ammunition 
markings” practice – which means to have complete information regarding characteristics of 
the ammunition, which span from the make to the date of production – aims at reducing the risk 
stemming from the “manipulation” of specific weapons. For instance, ammunition containing 
explosives or other dangerous substances (such as phosphor) need to be classified according 
to their hazard level. Ammunition markings are also a useful tool in tracking down the source 
of ammunitions during criminal investigations, such ownership and use of illicitly acquired 
ammunition.
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All ammunition (including the obsolete ones), awaiting for destruction, should be 
registered carefully. Each piece of ammunition should be identified, in order to know its legal 
status and where it is stored. Register keeping deals with the registration of data collected through 
registration; together with registration, register keeping should accompany an ammunition for 
its entire “life”, from production to destruction (IDEM). 
In addition to the ammunition marking and registration, the storage of conventional 
ammunition entails a set of activities directed to reduce the risk of explosion or other serious 
accidents. Inventory should be updated monthly or quarterly and each peripheral location 
should inform the main centre, if possible, through an electronic system managed online. This 
activity aims at knowing if, during the relevant period, some material was lost, due to theft, 
accident, etc. At the end of each year, in order to verify the effective stocks of ammunition, a 
physical inventory (i.e., a manual counting) should be produced.
Internal reports are very important so that an effective information updating about 
ammunition stocks can be performed. Within 72 hours every kind of loss, including theft or 
destruction of ammunition and explosives, should be communicated to the central command. 
This, above-mentioned practice should be implemented to facilitate the recovering of any lost 
material. All these activities make necessary to carry out a process of specific professional 
development for employees, so that at the macro level there is an effective knowledge, at any 
given time, of the stockpile of ammunition and explosives.  
Risk management in military commands is not limited to the ammunition markings, 
registration and record keeping of each single piece; it is very important to avoid a mixed 
storage: in fact, due to the chemical properties of a substantial fraction of ammunition and 
explosives, mixed storage can increase the risk of an explosion and compound its consequences. 
The top priority in regard to the management of an ammunition storage site is protecting the 
environment and the civilians living nearby. In this regard, some best practices can also be 
implemented outside the storage site. It is in fact recommended to regularly trim of plants and 
trees around such storage sites.
Each storage unit should be marked with a symbol, according to the risk classification of 
United Nations labelling, which previews nine classes of risk. A Standard Operating Procedures 
manual should contain all the operational procedures regarding the security and the reduction 
of each single potential risk inside the storage unit. A very important indication deals with the 
deterioration of ammunition and explosives. A constant activity of controlling the quality of this 
material is fundamental to guarantee the minimization of risk related to an explosion. Groups 
of compatibility of ammunition and explosives should be formed, so to improve the level of 
security. 
Another central requisite for the minimization of risk is the NEQ (i.e., Net Quantity 
Explosive) for each set of ammunition. Through the NEQ, it is possible to calculate the direct 
distance between the ammunition storage site and civilians’ dwellings. The NEQ is to be 
divulged publicly by the competent organism to both the media and the civil population (IDEM). 
At a regional level, at least two documents have to be mentioned, both approved in 2001: 
the Nairobi Protocol for Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in the Great Lake Regions and the Horn of Africa, and the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, 
Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) Region (the last one was ratified by Mozambique in 2002 and that came into effect in 
2004). In this protocol, one of the most important requirements is the commitment to destroy 
the entire stockpile of obsolete and redundant weapons. 
Starting from these principles, information and involvement of local community 
represents the best practice to guarantee accountability. In Africa, some experiences have been 
realized. In Kenya, for example, a community-driven approach to small and light weapons has 
been implemented with the help of the Britannic organization Saferworld. One of the central 
points is the operationalization of a monitoring system in local police stations to improve arms 
accountability, within a more general perspective directed to the building of confidence in the 
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police. In South Sudan a process a global contention and control of arms and arms depots has 
been implemented in partnership with local government, with community-level campaigns of 
information in Warrap State (Safeworld, 2015). In Mauritania, a NATO program leaded by Italy 
with a total amount of 2,25 million Euros has been implemented in 2014, in order to build two 
new arms depots, according to international safety and security standards (Nato, 2014).
In Mozambique, as presented in the next point, the situation is completely different, 
since local authorities continue to consider arms depots – as many other public goods - as 
“their affair”, managing them with a very high level of confidentiality and a very low level of 
information.
Risk Management in Mozambique: A General Overview
In Africa, with the partial exception of Tanzania, all the countries in which explosions of 
ammunition storages occurred have been characterized by political and military instability. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Sudan, Nigeria, confirm this pattern. Especially 
after the end of the Cold War, when countries belonging to Warsaw Pact lost control of those 
African arms depots they had supplied, significant amounts of arms went out these storages, 
aiding local wars, terrorism and common delinquency. The low level of risk management inside 
warehouses in Africa was due only in part to technical reasons. In fact, the low level of risk 
management was due to an intentional choice by military (and political) bodies to have freedom 
to trade in the market for these arms (Gramizzi, 2014). 
This scenario usually led local authorities to refrain from publicly sharing any kind of 
information or not engage in risk communication involving arms and arms depots activities. 
This is especially true when one looks at explosions of warehouses, before, during, and after 
the accident. Only in the most serious cases of explosions with a high number of fatalities 
(such as at the Malhazine warehouse in Mozambique in 2007) government is forced to do 
something. Generally, it means the adoption of measures to attribute individual responsibilities 
(to representatives of political or military bodies), but these mechanisms rarely led to understand 
the specific reasons and culprits for the occurrence of such tragic facts.
This mechanism not only hinders knowledge, but also makes it impossible to learn 
“best practices” based on previous mistakes. In fact, the audit is usually considered top secret 
information. In this way, the risk reduction is difficult, since the managing structure is generally 
trying to make up formal justifications and avoiding deep analysis of the facts that occurred.
Mozambique is a very good example of this approach employed to manage military 
risk. This kind of risk management should be considered as a more general idea of how risk 
is managed in political contexts characterized by lack of communication, information and of 
locals’ involvement. 
Cultural and historical reasons are the explanations for such approach: after having 
obtained its independence in 1975, Mozambique adopted a Marxist-Leninist system managed 
by Frelimo, a one-State party. A culture of suspicious was vastly widespread all over the country 
and dissent was eliminated, often in violent forms (Seibert, 2003; Meneses, 2015); a consistent 
movement of opposition – called Renamo, supported by Rhodesia, South Africa and USA – 
started a civil war which ended only in 1992, with a General Pace Agreement signed in Rome. 
Mozambique has been considered for a long time as one of the best cases of peace process and 
democratization in Africa.
Nonetheless, Mozambican democracy has never been inclusive, as its position in 
international rankings regarding freedom shows, classifying this country as “partly free” 
(Freedom House, 2017). Renamo never recognized electoral results, due to claims of 
serious frauds in each general election that was held (Cip/Awepa, 2014). Despite explicit 
recommendations as set in the General Peace Agreement, Renamo never completely dismissed 
its military loyalist base, so that Renamo has always been considered not only as the main 
political party of opposition in Mozambique, but also as a military force with an army parallel 
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to the governmental one. This situation contributed to shape an “ambiguous democracy”, 
constantly at crossroads between the implementation of a democratic model and a military 
solution of this endless conflict. 
Since the beginning of his government (2004), the idea supported by President Armando 
Guebuza – in charge until 2014 - was a “final solution” for Renamo and his leader, Dhlakama 
(Macamo, 2014). Therefore, the recurrence of the civil war in 2013 was the natural consequence 
of Guebuza’s new strategy.
The state of emergency was never declared, but this new season of civil war, albeit 
circumscribed in some areas, resulted in the treatment of all issues of political and military type 
as highly confidential. The control by the government on public opinion was incremented, as the 
management of various risks can easily demonstrate. Environmental risks have been managed 
through an approach of strict confidentiality, as the case of Mozal bypass shows (Bussotti, 
2014b), or ignoring the legitimate expectations of people forced to resettle as in the case of a 
coal mine in the Tete Province (Brazil).  (Andrade e Sousa, 2016); Traditionally, social risk has 
been faced through a military response, provoking about 15 deaths during the demonstrations 
that occurred in 2008 and 2010, and deciding to force the local telephone operators to register 
all their customers in about three months, in order to have the state control the entire telephone 
traffic (Brito et al., 2015); political risk, represented, in the general elections of 2009, by a new 
party, the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), was managed excluding it in 9 out 
of 13 constituencies, purporting formal reasons (UE, 2009). 
The Management of Risk in Arms Depots in Mozambique: The Case of Malhazine’s 
Warehouse
In Mozambique, the management of military risk represented by arms depots followed 
the same principles of political risk management seen above: confidentiality, a top secret 
approach, reason of state and lack of information. This tendency has been accentuated once 
Guebuza decided to undertake a new, aggressive strategy towards Renamo, whose response 
was the recourse to arms.
Guebuza gave a considerable importance to Mozambican army: this element is visible 
not only by analysing his general politics, but also by looking at the State budget, in which 
military expenses constantly increased throughout the years, until the explosion of the worst 
financial scandal in Africa in the last few years, with more than 2 billion dollars of public secret 
debt contracted for strengthening the defence of Mozambican coasts and sea (Kroll, 2017). 
This new atmosphere of tension and, in the end, of war, has been used as a formal reason 
to cover under the “top secret” strategy every kind of information regarding the management of 
arms depots all over the country. In addition, the poor understanding regarding the concept of 
“public good” led to a sort of “informal privatization” of  State-owned assets (houses, cars, other 
kind of material , etc.) by  the ruling classes, associated to a very poor request of accountability 
by the public opinion and mass-media (Souza, 2013); this tendency is yet more accentuated 
within military environments, so that no one is worried to share with the public, information 
on what really happens inside arms depots, how these storages are managed and what kind of 
damages they can provoke. And all this happens, despite the fact that many ammunition depots 
in Mozambique are localized nearby very populated inhabited centres.
This incommunicability represents a sort of licence to manage arms storages as if they 
were a private matter among military bodies. If no independent or international entity can 
monitor what happens at those sites, that means that every kind of activities can be carried out. 
Despite the assurances that Mozambique had formally adopted international standard 
procedures to manage its stockpiles of obsolete ammunition and explosives, this country does 
not have any kind of computerized recording system and the level of risk information towards 
civilians living near a military command is very low, if not inexistent. 
In the same fashion, the amount of information shared with the local population (i.e., the 
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risk communication level) is very low. Between 1995 and 2007, Mozambique experienced five 
explosions in ammunition warehouses, with more than 115 fatalities and more than 464 injured. 
The most salient fact is that four out of the five explosions occurred at the same site: Malhazine, 
which lies right at the outskirts of Maputo (Seesac, 2007). The other explosion took place 
at the warehouse of Beira and, fortunately, no death occurred in that incident. Nevertheless, 
explosions continue also after the terrible accident of Malhazine. On January 29, 2017, the 
ammunition and weapon warehouse in Nacala (a city in Northern Mozambique) exploded. 
Furthermore, in 2012 Tito Risco, a local, died while trying to open at home a war device he had 
stolen from a military warehouse. Such device contained mercury and he was trying to extract 
the material in order to re-sell it.  (Redaction, 2012).
Before this situation, some paramount questions arise naturally. How did the Mozambican 
Government manage these highly risky storage sites that contain war material? And what kind 
of risk communication did the Government implement in order to prevent destruction hitting 
innocent civilians?
The causes of accidents in military warehouse are generally the following: 1) Unknown 
(33%). This is largely because military authorities consider the information relative to these 
occurrences top secret. Therefore, rarely the public receives credible explanation whatsoever. 
In order to avoid leaks, the information is also destroyed shortly after the occurrence, therefore 
precious evidence is forever lost.  2) Among the known causes, specialists indicate fire (19.6%), 
movements/handling (13.7%), security/sabotage (14.4%), auto-ignition of propellant (5.2%), 
lightning strike (5.2%), electrical (3.3%), other (5.2%) (Seesac, 2007). 
The strictly confidential approach that military and governmental authorities take 
“can lead to a reluctance to allocate responsibility” (Wilkinson, 2008: 132). However, a clear 
identification of the causes of these explosions could lead to a better management and reduction 
of risk, saving human lives. In particular, the causes of fire are largely unknown. In the case 
of explosion of a Nigerian military warehouse in 2002, the cause was external fires resulting 
in explosion (Idem: 132). In many other cases it is impossible to establish the leading cause, 
even if inappropriate activity related to storage and auto-ignition of propellant seem the main 
reasons. Despite few information available, it is possible to conclude that risk of undesirable 
explosions can be reduced by intensifying personnel training, by improving storage techniques, 
and by correctly identifying which stockpile should be considered a priority for destruction 
(Idem). 
In Mozambique there are 17 weapons warehouses (now 16, since the Malhazine storage 
site was closed and now it has been transforming in a natural park), whose security level is not 
known, but whose management is probably below international and regional standards. 
The case of explosions in Malhazine warehouse is not new. In 1985 the same military 
storage site exploded, provoking 13 fatalities. In 2002 the arms depot in Beira also exploded, 
and in March 2007 a tragedy struck again and was one of the most serious of the history of this 
kind of events worldwide. Local authorities considered this case as a top-secret event. Thus, 
information was scanty, unclear, and the tasks of attribution of responsibilities were not carried 
out.  As everybody needed a scapegoat, one was found in the Minister of Defence, Tomás 
Dai. This General, the former President Guebuza’s father-in-law, resigned one year after the 
explosion of the Malhazine depot, amid constant pressure by the local media.
Technically, the explosion at the Malhazine warehouse was due to about 20 tons 
of obsolete military weapons, resulting in more than 100 deaths, about 500 injured and the 
destruction of 12,000 homes. These precarious houses had been built nearby Malhazine depot, 
without respecting international standards regarding security.
In order to assess the causes of the disaster, the Mozambican Government entrusted 
three judges: António Pale, President of the Administrative Court and chief of the Commission, 
Augusto Paulino, President of the Court of Maputo, and Maria Benvida Levi, Director of the 
Centre of Juridical and Judiciary Formation, in order. 
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As it usually happens, Mozambican authorities did not divulgate the report elaborated 
by the three judges, but instead, they held a press conference to provide the public with the 
conclusions. The Commission confirmed that the explosion at Malhazine arms depot was 
due to high temperatures. However, Joseph Hanlon, quoting some conclusions of this report, 
stated that the three experts had observed that “the munitions which exploded were stored in 
a building with no roof, and so were exposed to sun, rain, heat and cold”. In addition, “the 
military was failing to observe the appropriate procedures for storing munitions and that there 
were “manifest irregularities” in the inspection of the shells”, but the commission excluded 
actions of sabotage or attempts to extract mercury from the shells (Hanlon, 2007a).
Many observers and politicians belonging to Renamo contested this conclusion: in his 
speech to the Mozambican Parliament, Eduardo Namburete expressed concerns regarding the 
Government’s position, observing that Malhazine depot posed yet a very real risk for civilians 
(Namburete, 2007). A Mozambican blogger, Komba Kanema, considered the justification 
given by government as not credible, adding that the most surprisingly new – communicated by 
the Minister of Defence, Tomás Dai - was that war device in Malhazine was stored outdoors, 
without much concern or care (Komba Kanema, 2007). 
As a report commissioned by the South-African Strategic Studies Institute after the 
explosion of Malhazine depot pointed out, Mozambique did not respect its commitment to 
eliminate obsolete arms, according to the above mentioned Protocol of SADC, ratified by 
Mozambique in 2002. In addition, this report accused openly Mozambican authorities to be 
directly responsible for the disaster: a series of questions and accusations were launched in 
the South-African report. Why were civilian dwellings built nearby the arms depot? Why 
Mozambique did not yet destroy all its obsolete arms? Why local authorities did not move the 
depot far away from such a densely populated site? And, finally, the report refutes the official 
version given by Mozambican Government, pointing out that high temperatures rarely can 
cause the tragic events occurred at Malhazine, concluding that it was a human error that caused 
the explosion (Stott, 2007).  
As a matter of fact, thus far, nobody has been able to establish conclusively what caused 
the explosion of Malhazine armour, due to the extremely confidential approach adopted by 
local authorities, as Banjo also purports (Banjo, 2010). 
SEESAC, together with UNDP, produced another independent report on the causes 
of this tragedy. The author was Adrian Wilkinson and the conclusions were similar to those 
reached by ISS. Once more, it is Joseph Hanlon who summarizes the results reached in the 
SEESAC report, as following: “Deterioration of the Physical or Chemical Condition of the 
Ammunition or Explosives”, in particular “Autocatalytic decomposition of propellant leading 
to spontaneous ignition.” (Hanlon, 2007b). 
Nevertheless, the most important element for the issue here approached – risk 
management and risk communication – is the declaration of Hanlon about the SEESAC report 
on Malhazine: “Adrian Wilkinson has requested that I remove that full report from the website 
because “institutional relationships between UNDP and the Govt of Mozambique may be 
negatively impacted if the whole document is left in the public forum”. I personally believe that 
the report should remain public, to avoid errors and misquotations. Nonetheless, I have acceded 
to Mr Wilkinson’s request” (Idem).
The Mozambican sociologist, Carlos Serra, which manages one of the best-known 
websites in the Lusophone Africa, “Diário de um sociólogo” (oficinadesociologia.blogspot.
com) posted the whole report issued by SEESAC. However, the actual report is no longer 
available. It means that the report has been removed as a form of censorship, as it already 
happened in the case of Joseph Hanlon.
Without carrying out a serious inquiry aimed at understanding the real causes of the 
tragedy and the people responsible for it, the Mozambican government preferred to constitute 
a Cabinet for the Support of the Victims of the Warehouse of Malhazine, headed by Cristina 
Matavel, whose main task was to rebuild the houses destroyed by the explosion. Carlos Tembe, 
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at that time city councillor in Maputo for the independent list “Juntos pela Cidade” denounced 
the very poor conditions of the new houses, built without following basic guidelines and in 
an environment characterized by corruption. In addition, he pointed out that five months after 
the tragic event, the Forum of citizens, which had been constituted to support the victims of 
Malhazine and their families had not played any meaningful role (Casas das vítimas, 2007). 
In addition to the enormous suffering stemming from the loss of their loved ones, many 
families did not have the legal right to be supported financially or compensated for the damages. 
The case of the couple composed by Rodrigues Mafuiane and Marcelina Langa is emblematic 
on how Mozambican authorities dealt with this situation. The couple lost two children in the 
explosion of the arms depot of Malhazine. Nonetheless, the local cabinet of Social Affairs 
informed them that the help would be limited for the burial’s expenses of their two children. 
Because, as minors, they received their subsistence by their parents, Mr. Rodrigues and his wife 
did not receive any other kind of financial help or indemnity (MMT, 2011). 
Final Remarks
Risk management and risk communication represent, today, basic instruments to prevent 
and diminish tragedies caused by man-made activities, such as those originated by explosions 
in military armour.
This study showed that it is possible to highlight some political and cultural characteristics 
that induce local authorities to maintain their strict confidentiality in the management of arms 
and ammunition depots.  Mozambique is probably paradigmatic in this sense: as a “partially 
free” country, it has experienced a prolonged  civil war and the approach inspiring local 
authorities regarding institutional issues, yet more when concerning  with military issues, 
continues to be characterized by  “high confidentiality”. Thus, local authorities did not prevent 
the accident and did not perform, in practice, any type of investigation, preferring instead to 
constitute, one month after the explosion, a Cabinet of Social Support to sustain the victims of 
the Malhazine accident, whose work left much to be desired. Scanty information circulated in 
this regard as well, although Estêvão João is probably correct when he writes that there is not 
much knowledge about a substantial number of people affected by the explosion filing claims 
probably because these people were refused compensation by the Government (JOÂO, 2015).
On the other hand, the Mozambican Government moved all the obsolete arms and 
ammunition that were still stored at the Malhazine depot far away the city of Maputo, while the 
military storage site of Malhazine has been transformed (as set in a 2012 Decree) in a Natural 
Park. Thus, the risk was physically removed, the area will be transformed in an ecological 
statement, but at least three great questions continue to be unresolved.
Firstly, the lack of information by the Mozambican Government did not help local 
authorities to learn new, “good practices”. Military structures will continue to manage obsolete 
arms and ammunition depots countrywide as they have been used to do till now, with a high 
risk of uncontrolled explosions. The last accident into the armoury of Nacala in 2012 confirms 
it. Military risk stemming from unfit storage and handling did not decrease after the Malhazine 
tragedy.
Secondly, to avoid other accidents, it is impossible to remove all other arms and 
ammunitions depots present all over the country. Mozambican authorities never formulated 
such hypothesis; nonetheless, a serious process of risk assessment of these military structures, 
especially those nearby populated centres, should be carried out. And this assessment should 
involve professionals, such as urbanists, architects and so on. 
Finally, the strategy of avoiding inquiries which could be used against public and military 
officials, in favour of very uncertain mechanisms of financial compensation for the victims 
and their families, does not appear the best way to prevent episodes as those of Malhazine: if 
nobody is responsible, thus it means that nobody should be held accountable for the death of 
more than 100 people. A good risk management should contain also procedures directed to 
identify tasks, responsibilities and, when necessary, culprits.
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The political and military tension which Mozambique is living has represented the main 
justification to induce local authorities to maintain a strict confidentiality on issues related to 
arms and ammunition depots. According to this logic, Renamo, the old enemy, cannot know the 
potential of arms and ammunition stored in Mozambican warehouses: so, all this delicate issue 
is managed as if it were a private question of political and military elite, leaving Mozambican 
society to the dark.
So, historical, cultural and political reasons are converging because in Mozambique very 
dangerous structures, like warehouses, continue to be managed according to principles contrary 
to the current theories of risk and communication management and to the basic principle of 
accountability of public structures.
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